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I Are these two sequences of information computationally
indistinguishable?
{g , gX1 , gX2 , gX3 , gX1X2 , gX2X3 , gX1X3 , {K1}h(gX1X2X3 ), {K2}K1 , {m}K2}
and
{g , gX1 , gX2 , gX3 , gX1X2 , gX2X3 , gX1X3 , {K1}h(gX1X2X3 ), {K2}K1 , {0}K2}
I We want a tool that can quickly answer such a question.
I The tool should be easily extended.
I Applications:
I Weak security: Eavesdropper, IND-CPA attacker
I Strong security: can be achieved by generic transformation from weak
to strong security.
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How it can be done
Model: Syntax
I A signature Σ = (S,≤S ,F) consists of a countably infinite set of
sorts S with partial order ≤S , and a finite set of functions F .
I There are three countably infinite sets N , X and P, where N is a set
of names, X is a set of first-order variables and P is a set of
second-order variables
I A term is
T ::= x
|n
|p(T1, . . . ,Tk)
|f (T1, . . . ,Tk)
I A frame is a sequence of terms
I Behaviours of functions are model by equational theories.
I We use ordered-sorts in order to capture the fact that a and a||b can
be different sorts but h(a) and h(a||b) are both valid (h is a hash).
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Model: Semantics
The language has a computational semantics
I Each sort is associated with a set of bitstrings
I Each function symbol is associated with a real function
I Each name is evaluated to a nonce of its sort.
I Each second-order variable is evaluated by the adversary
I Then terms and frames are evaluated recursively.
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Computational Soundness: Static Equivalence vs
Formal Indistinguishability (FIR) 1
I Static Equivalence means the symbolic attacker cannot distinguish
between two frames by using the equivalence theories (which abstract
the behaviours of functions)
I Static Equivalence: start from what the attacker can do (modeled
symbolically) to show what the attacker cannot do.
I Formal Indistinguishability: start from what the attacker cannot do to
show what else the attacker cannot do.
I FIR is closer to computational indistinguishability, which is based on a
set of hard problem assumption.
I Example: {x1 = g , x2 = ga, x3 = gb, x4 = ga2∗b2}and
{x1 = g , x2 = ga, x3 = gb, x4 = g c} are statically equivalent, but not
necessarily implied by the DDH assumption.
1proposed by Bana
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Formal Indistinguishability Definitions
I Given an equational theory =E , FIR is defined as:
(GE1) If φ1 ∼= φ2 then φφ1 ∼= φφ2 for any frame φ such that
var(φ) ⊆ dom(φi ) and name(φ) ∩ name(φi ) = ∅.
(GE2) φ1 ∼= φ2 if φ1 =E φ2.
(GE3) τ(φ) ∼= φ for any renaming τ .
I The first rule captures the fact: for any algorithm A, if x ∼= y , then
A(x) ∼= A(y).
I If the generating set Si is computationally sound, then FIR is
computationally sound.
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Example
I One may start from Si = {{g , ga, gb, gab} ∼= {g , ga, gb, g c}} to
generate {{g , ga, gb, 2gab} ∼= {g , ga, gb, 2g c}}
I Can this be generated?
{g , gX1 , gX2 , gX3 , gX1X2 , gX2X3 , gX1X3 , {K1}h(gX1X2X3 ), {K2}K1 , {m}K2}∼=
{g , gX1 , gX2 , gX3 , gX1X2 , gX2X3 , gX1X3 , {K1}h(gX1X2X3 ), {K2}K1 , {0}K2}
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Formal Indistinguishability with Hash
I Informally, h(x) ∼= r if x is non-derivable (Random Oracle Model).
I Because of hash, the concept of Formal Non-Derivability (FNDR)
is proposed by Ene et al.
I Similarly to FIR, there are 7 closure rules to generate a set of FNDR
from an initial set Sd , which models a set of hardness assumption.
I Example: One may start from Sd = {{g , ga, gb}  g c} to generate
{{g , ga, gb} ∼= 2g c}
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How can we automatically check FIR
I FIR is an transitive, so we can use an abstract rewriting system for
reasoning.
I Term rewriting cannot be used because FIR is a relation on frames
and not a congruence.
I We define a rewriting system called FIR-frame rewriting system,
which is tailored to suits FIR
I Then the check can be automated, provided that the rewriting system
is convergent.
I However, if a frame contains hash, then we have to check
non-derivability.
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How can we automatically check FNDR
I Automatic check for FNDR is more tricky, because FNDR is not
transitive
I Example: {g , ga, gb}  g c and {g c}  ga, but {g , ga, gb}  ga is
wrong.
I Solution: Design a semi-decision procedure, which covers most of
practical cases.
I Work is still in progress.
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I IND-CPA Security of an encryption scheme can be represented as the
indistinguishability between two frames, which have second-order
variables.
I Example: The security of ElGamal scheme is expressed as:
{x0 = g , x1 = ga, x2 = gb, x3 = ga∗b.p(g , ga)} ∼= {x0 = g , x1 =
ga, x2 = s, x3 = t}
I If you want IND-CCA scheme, there exists a method to transform an
IND-CPA to IND-CCA encryption scheme.
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Key exchange protocol
I Passive security of key exchange protocol can also be expressed as the
indistinguishability between two frames
I Example: Security of a tripartite DH key exchange protocol can be
expressed as
{g , gX1 , gX2 , gX3 , gX1X2 , gX2X3 , gX1X3 , gX1X2X3}
∼=
{g , gX1 , gX2 , gX3 , gX1X2 , gX2X3 , gX1X3 , g c}
I Also, there exist a method which transform a pasively secure key
exchange to an actively secure one.
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Scalability
I Unlike static equivalence, combine signatures in FIR is simple
I As long as the FIR in each signature is computationally sound, then
the FIR in the combined signature is also computationally sound.
I This is from the fact that the computational soundness depends only
on the generating sets.
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Conclusion
I A potential tool for automated proofs of computational
indistinguishability is presented
I We use the notion Formal Indistinguishability, which is extended to
cover ordered sorts
I The tool has great scalability due to the easiness to combine
signatures
I Potential application of the tool is presented.
I The work is still in progress. Comments are extremely welcome.
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